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On page 293, footnote 30 which read: 189 N.E. 2d 641 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) should have read: 189 N.E. 2d 
641 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963), rev'd, 176 Ohio St. 362, 199 N.E. 2d 742 (Sup. Ct. 1964). 




FINDING OF GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT DOES NOT REQUIRE A
UNANIMOUS VERDICT
The defendants were convicted of petit larceny by the Criminal Court of
the City of New York. That court, a three-judge panel, determined the factual
issues without a jury. Two of the judges voted for conviction but the third was
not convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and voted for acquittal. The
Appellate Term, Second Department, affirmed the conviction unanimously
without opinion. On appeal by permission, the Court of Appeals unanimously
affirming, held, the rule that the prosecution must prove a defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt can be satisfied without a unanimous decision of a
three-judge bench. People v. DeCillis, 14 N.Y.2d 203, 250 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1964).
In light of recent decisions involving the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, one might contend that the right to trial by jury is due to
be extended to all criminal prosecutions by the states.1 However, the case law to
date indicates that the right to trial by jury as guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution does not apply to prosecutions by the
states.2 The New York Constitution guarantees the right to trial by jury in
criminal matters. 3 However, it provides that the legislature may authorize
misdemeanors and lesser offenses to be tried without a jury.4 In 1962, the
legislature enacted the New York City Criminal Court Act.5 The Act abolished
the Court of Special Sessions whose history dates back to 1744 with enact-
ments of the colonial legislature. The first Court of Special Sessions was estab-
lished to try crimes under the degree of grand larceny when the accused was
unable to produce bail so as to await the regular court session, and where
imprisonment would be unfair to him or to the economic well-being of his
family." It was a jury-less court with three members and agreement of two of
them was sufficient to convict.7 The state of New York continued the court in
1787, maintaining the same majority requirement for conviction. 8 Its jurisdic-
tion was limited to petit larceny and obtaining goods (petit larceny value) by
false pretenses.0 The jurisdiction of the Court varied through the years, but
basically the procedural requirement of two votes for conviction was main-
tained.10 The 1962 enactment grants the New York City Criminal Court jurisdic-
1. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646, 657 (1961); see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 340 (1963); see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 32 (1963).
2. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 595, 604 (1900); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 324 (1937) ; Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288 (1947).
3. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2.
4. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 18.
5. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 697.
6. 3 Colonial Laws of New York, ch. 767 (1744).
7. Ibid.
8. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1787, ch. 65.
9. Ibid.
10. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1801, ch. 70, § 9; N.Y. Revised Laws 1813, ch. 85, § 13; N.Y.
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tion over non-indictable misdemeanors (except libel) and lesser offenses.
11 It
provides that the accused is not entitled to a trial by jury. 2 Charges are to be
heard before a judge, but in cases of misdemeanors the accused may be tried
before a judge or a three-judge panel. 13 The accused or the prosecution may
exercise this option.' 4 The Act also provides that in matters heard before the
three judges, ". . . any determination, order or judgment of two of them shall be
the determination, order or judgment of the court . . ."15 Also significant is the
provision that all sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure consistent with the
act shall apply.16 The doctrine of reasonable doubt is expressed in the Code.'
7
The doctrine of reasonable doubt provides that unless the accused is found
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt he must be acquitted. The term "beyond a
reasonable doubt" has met with many attempts at definition. They have ranged
from the elaborate' 8 to the simple.19 One court felt it was a term which needed
no definition.20 In any event, one may safely say that the prosecution must
present more than a mere preponderance of evidence. On the other hand, the
jurors need not be convinced to an absolute certainty.2 1 The origin of the
reasonable doubt rule is unclear, but there is support for the contention that it
arose late in the eighteenth century,22 and that prior to that time the expressions
"clear belief," or clear "impression" set the standardp To reach a verdict of
guilty, jurors in New York must not only find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
24
but must do so unanimously. 5 The origin of the unanimity rule for juries is
traceable to the early usage of the jury in England.26 The Supreme Court of the
United States has said that unanimity was an essential characteristic of the
common law jury as adopted by the Federal Constitution.2 7 On the other hand
at least four states, Idaho, Montana, Oklahoma and Louisiana, provide for a
Sess. Laws 1895, ch. 601, § 13; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1897, ch. 378, § 1405; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1910,
ch. 659, § 34.
11. N.Y. City Crim. Ct. Act, § 31.
12. N.Y. City Crim. Ct. Act, § 40.
13. Ibid.
14. N.Y. City Crim. Ct. Act, § 40(2).
15. N.Y. City Crim. Ct. Act, § 42(4).
16. N.Y. City Crim. Ct. Act, § 41.
17. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 389.
18. In Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 320 (1850), the court
defined reasonable doubt as "... that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison
and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that
they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the
charge."
19. In People v. Orr, 243 App. Div. 394, 395, 277 N.Y. Supp. 294, 295 (1st Dep't 1935),
the court stated that to establish guilt the state must produce "... evidence which excluded
every other reasonable hypothesis, except that of guilt .... "
20. People v. Schuele, 326 Ill. 366, 372, 157 N.E. 215, 217 (1927).
21. State v. Bell, 262 Minn. 545, 548, 115 N.W.2d 468, 471 (1962).
22. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2497 (3d ed. 1940).
23. May, Some Rules of Evidence, 10 Am. L. Rev. 642, 657 (1876).
24. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 389.
25. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 428; People v. Light, 285 App. Div. 496, 497, 138 N.Y.S.2d
262, 264 (4th Dep't 1955).
26. 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 379 (Lewis Ed. 1902).
27. American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897).
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less than unanimous jury verdict for conviction in criminal cases.2 8 Is unanimity
necessary to a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? The four states
mentioned above apparently think not since guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is
required by each of them in criminal convictions.29 However, the Court of
Appeals of Ohio has taken the opposite position. In State v. Robbins,30 where the
court reversed a conviction by a non-unanimous three-judge bench, it stated
".... the difference of opinion as to guilt among the three trial judges ... not
only suggests but proves more than one conclusion possible." 31 The court rea-
soned that the dissent of one of three judges, who are all reasonable men, in
itself raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.32 The issue was first
presented in New York in People v. Scifo.33 That court, citing the Robbins case
felt unanimity was required to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and ex-
pressed doubt as to the constitutionality of the majority provision. However,
being the court of original jurisdiction, it was reluctant -to declare the provision
unconstitutional and left that determination for a higher court.34
The New York Court of Appeals, in affirming the conviction in the instant
case, did not reach the constitutional issue raised in the Scifo case but, took the
position that ". . . the reasonable doubt rule is a concept separate and distinct
from, and not interwoven with, the requirement of unanimity... (It) is a rule
of evidence which deals only with the quantum of proof necessary to convict;
it has nothing to do with the procedure by which the determination is
made .... ,,2r The Court refers to Fournier v. Gonzalez36 where the defendant
had been convicted of murder by a jury verdict of ten to two. He chose the jury,
where nine of the twelve agreeing could convict, rather than a judge.37 His writ
of habeas corpus, having been denied by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico,3 8
he appealed to the federal Court of Appeals which affirmed the denial, holding
that a less than unanimous verdict could satisfy the standard of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. That court cited only one case to support its thinking. The
case was Maxwell v. Dow where the Supreme Court of the United States by
way of dictum said the states were free to decide whether grand jury indictment,
trial by jury, or unanimous verdict will be required in non-capital cases.39 The
28. Idaho Code Crim. Proc. fit. 19, § 1902 (1947), Mont. Rev. Code, fit. 94, § 7002
(1947), Okla. Const. art. II, § 19 (applicable to crimes and offenses less than felony); La.
Stat. Ann., Rev. Stat. tit. 15, § 338 (1950) (applicable to noncapital felonies and crimes
"necessarily punishable by imprisonment at hard labor").
29. Idaho Code Crim. Proc. fit. 19, § 2104 (1947), Mont. Rev. Code, fit. 94, § 7203
(1947), Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 836 (1951), La. Stat. Ann., Rev. Stat. tit. 15, § 387
(1950).
30. 189 N.E.2d 641 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
31. Id. at 643.
32. Ibid.
33. 40 Misc. 2d 110, 242 N.Y.S.2d 980 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1963).
34. Id. at 116, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 986.
35. Instant case at 205, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
36. 269 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 931 (1959).
37. Id. at 28.
38. Id. at 27.
39. Supra note 2, at 604.
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Court in the instant case also noted the importance of maintaining one of the
inherent characteristics of a court, majority rule. As was stated by a Supreme
Court of this state in 1880,
The court then, in legal contemplation, proceeds as a court, and not as
a jury. Were this otherwise, the proceedings might, at any moment, be
obstructed and, indeed, summarily stopped. A single magistrate could
prevent a ruling upon the admission or rejection of evidence, . . . non-
concurrence as to the punishment would be sufficient to block the
wheels of justice. It cannot be said that, in these matters of illustra-
tion, the magistrates act as judges, while in convicting they act as a
jury. Their functions cannot be severed either in theory or practice.
They act throughout as a court. What the law requires is, not the
concurrence but the presence and deliberation of all three.40
The Court in the instant case also pointed out that in reviewing convictions in
capital cases it is charged with the duty to ". . . examine the evidence to
determine whether in our judgment it has been sufficient to make out a case ...
beyond a reasonable doubt."41 Unanimity is not required in such a determina-
tion.
The reasonable doubt doctrine provides a standard by which each trier of
fact determines, in his own mind, whether or not the defendant is guilty. Cer-
tainly an accused can be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, if there is
but one trier of fact. A mistrust of any one individual's judgement might urge
the usage of more than one trier of fact. An additional safeguard might be to
require unanimous agreement for conviction. The increase in the number of
fact finders, and the requirement of unanimity add to the safeguards provided
by the reasonable doubt rule. They provide a greater degree of certainty that
the truth has been reached. That certainty might be decreased by reducing the
number of fact finders or by dropping the unanimity requirement, but these
changes would have no effect upon the standard the individual triers of fact ap-
ply to reach their verdict. The courts in the Robbins and Scifo cases failed to
recognize the distinction between the two concepts. Yet, even if unanimity were
required for a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court in the Rob-
bins case goes too far. It concludes that disagreement among the triers of fact
proves the existence of a reasonable doubt.42 To the contrary, the disagreement
means only that the dissenter was unable to convince his colleagues that his
doubt was reasonable. The deadlock does not unanimously prove either the
existence or non-existence of a reasonable doubt as to guilt. To acquit at that
point in the proceedings would be an injustice to the state, since the issue of
guilt has not been resolved either way. This lack of determination is recognized
in jury trials, since a hung jury results in a re-trial.43 On the other hand, the
court in the Scifo case, in its attack upon the constitutionality of the majority
40. People ex rel. Sammons v. Wandell, 21 Hun 515, 516 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1880).
41. Instant case at 206, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
42. Supra note 30, at 644.
43. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 430.
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procedure, failed to consider the fact that this majority-to-convict precedure
originated in New York before the Constitution was adopted, was being used
at the time that document was adopted and basically has been used ever since.44
With that in mind, it would be difficult to argue that the procedure violates due
process of law as it was known to the framers of that Constitution. Significant
however, is the fact that the procedure was origanally set up for the convenience
of the accused, 45 whereas today it is used to expedite the business of the
Criminal Court of the City of New York. The convenience of the court has
never been a convincing factor when weighed against the rights of an accused
in a criminal prosecution..
THomAs L. DAVID
CoRAm NOBIS-NOT AvAILABLE WHERE COUNSEL HAS FAILED TO FILE TIMELY
NOTICE OF APPEAL WHEN REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT
In two recent cases, defendants were sentenced to prison terms following
their felony convictions. Joseph Marchese and Thomas Kling decided to ap-
peal and so informed their attorneys. Both were assured that notice of appeal
would be filed, but neither attorney took the necessary action. Attempting to
reinstate the lost right to appeal, defendants applied to their respective trial
courts by writ of error coram nobis. 1 From the orders of the trial courts
denying hearings, defendants appealed to the Appellate Division, Second De-
partment, where the orders were affirmed. Defendants then appealed to the
Court of Appeals which held, in both cases, affirmed, without opinion (three
judges dissenting,2 voting to reverse and order hearings). Coram nobis is not
available where counsel assigned for trial (Kling) or retained by defendant
(Marchese) had been requested to file notice of appeal, had promised to do
so, but failed in that task. People v. Kling, 19 A.D.2d 750, 242 N.Y.S.2d 977
(2d Dep't 1963) (one judge dissenting), 3 aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 571, 198
N.E.2d 46, 248 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1964), motion to amend remittitur granted, 14
N.Y.2d 687, 198 N.E.2d 913, 249 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1964), petition for cert. filed,
Misc. Calendar, July 1, 1964 (No. 198); People v. Marchese, 19 A.D.2d 728,
44. Supra notes 6, 8 and 10.
45. Supra note 6.
1. If the trial court found that the excuses were adequate as a matter of law, it
would order hearings to determine the factual sufficiency of defendants' assertions. Then,
upon a finding that the excuses were supported by facts, the court would vacate the
original judgment of conviction and impose a new sentence at that time. This would
have the effect of giving defendants a new time in which to appeal.
2. The same three judges dissented in both cases: Desmond, C.J., Fuld and
Bergan, JJ.
3. Noted in 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 578 (1964). Previous to this Appellate Division
decision the following occurred: Appeal dismissed, 11 A.D.2d 917 (2d Dep't 1958) (failure
to prosecute) ; cert. denied, 361 U.S. 935 (1960) ; petition for writ of habeas corpus denied,
188 F. Supp. 470 (N.D.N.Y. 1960), affirmed, 306 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1962) (existing state
remedy); dismissal of appeal vacated, (App. Div. 2d Dep't) 148 N.Y.L.J. 16 (Oct. 11, 1962).
